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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A central result in general equilibrium theory is the First Welfare Theorem.
This theorem shows that, under a relatively small set of assumptions, every
competitive equilibrium allocation is Pareto eﬃcient.
The most popular (and in fact the only widely known) way of establishing
the First Welfare Theorem is to carry out a proof by contradiction. With few
variations, this is the approach usually found in most (if not all) textbooks.
Some examples are Aliprantis, Brown and Burkinshaw [1]; Arrow and Hahn [3];
Mas-Collel, Green and Whinston [7] and Takayama [9]. This proof was ﬁrst
presented by Kenneth Arrow in [2].
A proof by contradiction should not be used if a direct proof is available.
For instance, Paul Halmos stated this (see Knuth, Larrabee and Roberts [6],
page 111). Halsey Royden stated the same on page 3 of his classic textbook
[8] on Real Analysis. This last author goes as far as to write “All students are
enjoined in the strongest possible terms to eschew proofs by contradiction! The
reason for this prohibition ...” (my emphasis).
There are at least four reasons to prefer direct proofs. The ﬁrst is purely
stylistic. A direct proof is usually more elegant than a proof by contradiction.
The second reason is mentioned in Royden [8]. A proof by contradiction often
does not illustrate the connection between the hypotheses and the statement to
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be proved. A direct proof clearly shows how the postulates lead to the desired
conclusion. The third reason is also provided by Royden [8]. Mistakes are more
common in proofs by contradiction. The fourth reason is the strongest one.
Royden [8] states that “In proofs by contradiction, however, you are (assuming
the theorem is true) in the unreal world where any statement can be derived,
and so the falsity of a statement is no indication of an erroneous deduction.”
The controversy about proofs by contradiction can be summarized as fol-
lows. A small number of researchers will say that a proof by contradiction is
not a proof. Most of them will prefer a direct proof to a proof by contradic-
tion, particularly if the direct proof illustrates in a more eﬀective way how the
postulates lead to the desired result.
Let R and S be any statements. Suppose that one wants to show that
[R ⇒ S]. A direct proof consists of starting from R and, after some logical steps,
arriving at S. A proof by contradiction starts by assuming that the statement
[R &( ¬S)] (where ¬ means ‘not’) is true. It ﬁnishes by showing that this leads
to a contradiction. The contraposition approach is to show that [(¬S) ⇒ (¬R)]
using a direct proof. Since the statements [R ⇒ S] and [(¬S) ⇒ (¬R)] are
equivalent, it does not matter which of the two implications is established by
direct reasoning.
The First Welfare Theorem states that if a price system and an allocation is
a competitive equilibrium, then this allocation is Pareto eﬃcient. The standard
proof starts by assuming that some competitive equilibrium allocation is not
Pareto eﬃcient. It ﬁnishes by obtaining a contradiction. A contraposition argu-
ment is used in this essay. It is shown that if an allocation is not Pareto eﬃcient,
then this allocation is not a competitive equilibrium allocation (regardless of the
prevailing price system).
The proof presented in this note has the obvious advantage of not being
aﬀected by Royden’s harsh criticism. It also establishes a more direct connection
between the concepts of competitive equilibrium and Pareto eﬃciency. The
proof clearly shows that any feasible allocation that is not Pareto eﬃcient cannot
be supported, as a competitive equilibrium, by any vector of prices. This is
exactly the same argument used to convince an undergraduate student that an
allocation that does not lay on the contract curve of an Edgeworth’s box is not
a competitive equilibrium allocation.
This paper is not the ﬁrst one to establish the First Welfare Theorem without
resorting to a contradiction argument. Debreu shows on pages 94 and 95 of his
Theory of Value [4] that if an allocation is feasible it cannot Pareto dominate a
competitive equilibrium allocation. On page 101 of [5], Debreu shows that any
allocation that makes some agent better-oﬀ without harming another (when
compared to a competitive equilibrium allocation) is not feasible. Compared
to Debreu’s proofs, the one presented in this paper has the advantage of being
simpler and more intuitive.
This paper is organized as follows. For simplicity, the new approach to
prove the First Welfare Theorem is initially used in a pure exchange economy
in Section 2. The argument is generalized to an economy with production in
Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
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2 A Pure Exchange Economy
T h e r ee x i s t sas e tI = {1,2,...,I} of consumers and a set L = {1,2,...,L}
of commodities. The commodity space is RL
+. Each consumer i ∈Ihas a
preference relation  i on her consumption set Xi ⊆ RL
+ and has an initial
endowment  i ∈ Xi.A su s u a l ,xi  i ˜ xi means that xi  i ˜ xi and ˜ xi  i xi.A n
allocation is a vector x ∈ RIL
+ .Itc a nb ew r i t t e n a s x =( x1,x 2,...,xI),w h e r e
each xi ∈ Xi. A price system is any vector p ∈ RL
+. Given a price system p,t h e
budget set of consumer i is the set Bi(p)={xi ∈ Xi : p · xi ≤ p ·  i}.
The deﬁnitions that follow spell out the remaining introductory formalities.
Deﬁnition 1 A preference relation  i is locally non-satiable if for every ¯ xi ∈
Xi and all δ>0 there exists ˜ xi ∈{ xi ∈ Xi :  xi − ¯ xi  <δ } satisfying ˜ xi  i ¯ xi.
Deﬁnition 2 Ab u n d l exi ∈ Xi is a maximal element for  i on a set ˜ Xi ⊆ Xi
if xi  i ˜ xi for all ˜ xi in ˜ Xi.




i=1  i and xi ∈ Xi
for all i.
Deﬁnition 4 An allocation x is Pareto eﬃcient if it is feasible and there is no
feasible allocation ¯ x that satisﬁes ¯ xi  i xi for all i and ¯ xi  i xi for some i.
Deﬁnition 5 A competitive equilibrium is a vector (p,x) that satisﬁes:
1. x is feasible;
2. for each i, xi is a maximal element for  i on Bi(p).
Theorem 1 Suppose that each  i is locally non-satiable. If (p,x) is a compet-
itive equilibrium, then x is Pareto eﬃcient.
Proof. It is enough to show that if an allocation x is not Pareto eﬃcient, then
there is no price system p such that (p,x) is a competitive equilibrium. Take
any x that is not Pareto eﬃcient and any price system p.E i t h e r ( i ) x is not
feasible or (ii) x is feasible and there exists another feasible allocation ¯ x that
satisﬁes ¯ xi  i xi for all i and ¯ xi  i xi for some i, say i =1 . If (i) is true there is









p · ¯ xi =
I 
i=1
p ·  i .( 1 )
Consider the inequality
p · ¯ xi ≤ p ·  i (2)
If (2) holds for i =1 , x1 cannot be a maximal element for  1 on the set B1(p).
Thus, (p,x) is not a competitive equilibrium. If (2) fails for i =1 , (1) implies
that there exists a consumer k such that p · ¯ xk <p·  k.S i n c e  k is locally
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non-satiable, there exists a ˜ xk ∈ B(p) satisfying ˜ xk  k ¯ xk  k xk . Therefore,
xk cannot be a maximal element for  k on the set Bk(p), from which follows
that (p,x) is not a competitive equilibrium. 
Deﬁnition 3 assumed the absence of free disposal. This is not essential for the
proof. The same reasoning would work for an economy with free disposal (if one
bears in mind that with locally non-satiable preferences there is no competitive
equilibrium with a negative price).
It should be clear that the approach used in the proof of theorem 1 will also
show that a competitive equilibrium allocation belongs to the core.
3 A Production Economy
The environment builds on the one described in Section 2. There exists a set
I = {1,2,...,I} of consumers, a set L = {1,2,...,L} of commodities and a set
J = {1,2,...,J} of ﬁrms. The commodity space is RL
+.E a c h ﬁ r m j ∈J has
a production set Yj ⊆ RL
+. Each consumer i ∈Ihas a preference relation
 i on her consumption set Xi ⊆ RL
+ and an initial endowment  i ∈ Xi.A n
allocation is a vector (x,y) ∈ R
(I+J)L
+ ,w h e r ex ∈ RIL
+ and y ∈ RJL
+ .It c a n
be written as (x,y)=( x1,x 2,...,xI,y 1,y 2,...,y J),w h e r exi ∈ Xi and yj ∈
Yj. A price system is any vector p ∈ RL
+. The matrix Θ=[ θij]I×J,w h e r e
θij ≥ 0, describes the share of ﬁrm j’s proﬁt that is owned by consumer i.O f
course,
I
i=1 θij =1for every j. The budget set of consumer i is Bi(p,y)= 
xi ∈ Xi : p · xi ≤ p ·  i +
J
j=1 θijp · yj

.
Locally non-satiable preferences and maximal element are deﬁned as in the
previous section. The remaining deﬁnitions are:




i=1  i +
J
j=1 yj,
xi ∈ Xi for all i and yj ∈ Yj for all j.
Deﬁnition 7 An allocation (x,y) is Pareto eﬃcient if it is feasible and there is
no feasible allocation (¯ x, ¯ y) that satisfy ¯ xi  i xi for all i and ¯ xi  i xi for some
i.
Deﬁnition 8 A competitive equilibrium is a vector (p,x,y) that satisﬁes:
1. (x,y) is feasible;
2. for each j, p · yj ≥ p · ¯ yj for all ¯ yj ∈ Yj;
3. for each i, xi is a maximal element for  i on Bi(p,y).
Theorem 2 Suppose that each  i is locally non-satiable. If (p,x,y) is a com-
petitive equilibrium, then (x,y) is Pareto eﬃcient.
Proof. Take an allocation (x,y) that is not Pareto eﬃcient and a price system
p. It suﬃces to show that (p,x,y) is not a competitive equilibrium. Either (i)
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(x,y) is not feasible or (ii) (x,y) is feasible and there exists another feasible
allocation (¯ x, ¯ y) that satisﬁes ¯ xi  i xi for all i and ¯ xi  i xi for some i, say
i =1 . If (i) is true there is nothing to show. Consider the situation in which
(ii) holds. If p · yj <p· ¯ yj for some j, (p,x,y) is not a competitive equilibrium.












p · ¯ xi =
I 
i=1
p ·  i +
J 
j=1
p · ¯ yj =
I 
i=1





θijp · ¯ yj ≤
I 
i=1





θijp · yj ⇒ (3)
I 
i=1
p · ¯ xi ≤
I 
i=1







p · ¯ xi ≤ p ·  i +
J 
j=1
θijp · yj (4)
holds for i =1 , x1 cannot be a maximal element for  1 on the set B1(p,y).T h u s ,
(p,x,y) is not a competitive equilibrium. If (4) fails for i =1 , the last inequality
in (3) implies that there is a consumer k such that p· ¯ xk <p· k +

j θkjp·yj.
Since  k is locally non-satiable, there exists a ˜ xk ∈ B(p,y) satisfying ˜ xk  k ¯ xk
 k xk . Therefore, xk cannot be a maximal element for  k on the set Bk(p,y).
Hence, (p,x,y) is not a competitive equilibrium. 
4 Conclusion
The standard approach to prove the First Welfare Theorem is to carry out
a proof by contradiction. That technique was ﬁrst presented in Arrow [2].
Despite the fact that Debreu provided two alternative proofs without using
a contradiction argument, Arrow’s proof is the only one that is widely known
among economists.
Proofs by contradiction should not be used whenever a direct proof is avail-
able. This is partially due to stylistic and didactic reasons. But it is also (and
most important) due to the fact that some of researchers do not accept an
argument by contradiction as a valid proof.
In this essay the First Welfare Theorem was established, for both pure ex-
change and production economies, by a simple and direct reasoning. This classic
economic result is then reconciled with mathematicians’ distaste for proofs by
contradiction and liking of simple and intuitive arguments.
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